Tracking can be more equitable than mixing: Peer effects and college attendance by Marisa Hidalgo-Hidalgo
 
 










Tracking can be more equitable than 

















Tracking can be more equitable than mixing: 





Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville 
 
Abstract 
Parents and policy makers often wonder whether, and how, the choice between a tracked 
or a mixed educational system affects the efficiency and equity of national educational 
outcomes.  This  paper  analyzes  this  question  taking  into  account  their  impact  on 
educational results at later stages and two main results are found. First, it shows that 
tracking can be the efficient system in societies where the opportunity cost of college 
attendance is high or the pre-school achievement distribution is very dispersed. Second, 
this paper shows that tracking is the most equitable system for students with intermediate 
levels of human capital required to attend college. 
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Parents and policy makers often wonder whether, and how, the choice between a
tracked or a mixed educational system a⁄ects the e¢ ciency and equity of national
educational outcomes. Under tracking, schools are hierarchically organized to accom-
modate a range of student performance levels, and students are placed in the school
that best suits their ability level. By contrast, mixing works by grouping students
of di⁄ering ability levels within the same school. When comparing these systems, it
is critically important to recognize the existence of peer interactions and account for
their impact on students￿outcomes.1
This paper analyzes the e¢ ciency and equity of tracking versus mixing, within a
theoretical framework, paying special attention to the impact of compulsory school
peer e⁄ects on college attendance. I de￿ne an equitable system as one that gives
students equal access to a college education, regardless of their family background. I
de￿ne an e¢ cient system as one in which the total human capital of the entire cohort
is maximized by the end of the educational period (that is, upon college graduation).
To address these issues, a model is introduced with two educational stages: com-
pulsory and college education. Students di⁄er in parental background as well as
pre-school achievement levels. Some positive dependence between these two de￿ning
variables is assumed, as wealthy parents have more resources to invest in their chil-
dren, and also tend to be more educated and care more about education, factors that
enhance their children￿ s performance at school. The acquisition of human capital at
compulsory level depends on both students￿pre-school achievement and peer group
characteristics. The latter also indirectly a⁄ects students￿human capital accumu-
lation in college. Two types of tracking are introduced that di⁄er in the degree of
elitism or segregation of students of di⁄erent parental background among the tracks.
The degree of elitism of tracking is found to be a central aspect in determining the
existence of trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and equity.
Two main ￿ndings result from my analysis. First, I ￿nd that maximizing human
capital at one level (compulsory) does not immediately imply that human capital
is maximized at the end of the whole educational process. The impact of the edu-
1There is a large empirical literature on peer e⁄ects and still an open debate on the in￿ uence of
peers on individual educational achievement with some studies ￿nding little or no e⁄ects (e.g. Angrist
and Lang (2004) and Foster (2006)) and others ￿nding large e⁄ects (e.g. Hoxby and Weingarth
(2006), Kim et al. (2006) and Ding and Lehrer (2007)).
2cational system prevailing at compulsory level on college attendance rates, together
with the properties of the human capital production at compulsory level must also
be considered. Second, and more strikingly, I show that tracking may sometimes be
more equitable than mixing.
If the government seeks to achieve e¢ ciency, its best option will depend on the
properties of the human capital production at compulsory level, on the opportunity
cost of college attendance and on the wealth level in the population. Provided that
tracking maximizes average human capital at compulsory level (for example, because
peer e⁄ects and individual achievement are close complements), it will also maximize
average human capital across the population if the opportunity cost of college at-
tendance is su¢ ciently high or the wealth level in the population is su¢ ciently low.2
Observe that, in this case, most students with low levels of pre-school achievement
are excluded from college under both systems. Therefore, intervention should be fo-
cused on those students with high pre-school achievement levels. Choosing tracking
over mixing is one way for governments to intervene in favour of these students and
maximize college attendance which, in turn, would maximize average human capital
across the population.
I also ￿nd tracking to be the most equitable system in contexts where the oppor-
tunity cost of college attendance is neither too low nor too high. In this case the type
of tracking determines the precise set of individuals who enjoy more equality of op-
portunities. In particular, in the non-elitist tracking (i.e. the one that allows a higher
proportion of poor students in the high track) the set of individuals at the margin are
those with intermediate levels of pre-school achievement who, under tracking, could
join the high track where the peer e⁄ect is the strongest. Thus, family background
does not critically determine the amount of human capital they can accrue after com-
pulsory education. By contrast, family background matters more under mixing, since
peer e⁄ects are weaker under this system for this group of students. Therefore, in
this case tracking outperforms mixing when it comes to equalizing college attendance
opportunities of students. To conclude, non-elitist tracking can be both e¢ cient and
equitable if the opportunity cost of college attendance takes intermediate values or
the wealth level in the population is low.
There are several theoretical papers related to this. Roemer and Wets (1994)
2If peer e⁄ects matter more for high ability students than for low ability ones, then average
human capital at compulsory level will be maximized under tracking since it is the system where
high ability students enjoy a stronger peer e⁄ect.
3and Streufert (2000), for example, focus on other kind of neighborhood e⁄ects as
important explanatory factors behind individual schooling choices.3 In Roemer and
Wets￿model, individuals form rational beliefs about the return to education when
they make schooling decisions. Students estimate the returns to education as the
best linear regression of the income against education of the parents in their neigh-
borhood. They ￿nd that incorrect beliefs (since the true returns are not linear) tend
to cause widespread dispersion of the stationary distribution of talent at any income
level. Streufert (2000) proposes a model in which students make inaccurate estimates
of the marginal product of e⁄ort at school, after observing a biased sample popula-
tion of adults. Their isolation depresses the level of schooling chosen by underclass
youth. Brunello and Giannini (2004) study the e¢ ciency of secondary school design
by focusing on the degree of di⁄erentiation between vocational and general educa-
tion. They show that neither a comprehensive nor a strati￿ed system unambiguously
outperforms the other in terms of e¢ ciency. Finally, Hidalgo-Hidalgo (2008) com-
pares the academic performance of compulsory school students under tracking and
mixing. There are also several empirical papers that explore equality of opportu-
nities of tracked versus mixed education systems. First, Hanushek and Woessmann
(2006) ￿nd, based on international comparisons of early outcomes, that early tracking
increases educational inequality. Brunello and Checchi (2007), who look at later out-
comes as employability and earnings, ￿nd that tracking reinforces family background
e⁄ects on labour market outcomes. However these studies su⁄er from two main lim-
itations, which may explain the di⁄erence between their conclusions and my own.
On the one hand, Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) only look at compulsory level
outcomes, which impedes them from observing the long-term e⁄ects of either sys-
tem. On the other hand, while Brunello and Checchi (2007) analyze later outcomes,
they fail to consider the distributional impact of family background on educational
outcomes and instead focus solely on mean impacts. My study goes a step further,
focusing not only on mean impacts but also on the distributional outcomes of di⁄er-
ent grouping policies, and determining how those policies may alter the composition
of such outcomes by hindering or enhancing the college attendance possibilities for
individuals.
This paper complements the existing literature by incorporating an optimal second
3Role model e⁄ects are a good example here. According to this model, characteristics of older
group members may in￿ uence the behaviour of other individual members of that group. See Durlauf
(2004) for an in-depth analysis of these types of models.
4stage of education (college), with educational achievement in the compulsory stage
being an input to it. This e⁄ect that has been neglected in the literature although
some empirical studies have shown that the quality of students￿peers at school can
in￿ uence their college attendance and performance rates (see Betts and Morell (1999)
and Hahn et al. (2008)).4 Hence, the e⁄ects of tracking versus mixing on college choice
and ultimate educational achievement are considered in the paper. Finally, this paper
complements the theoretical literature on tracking by explicitly discussing the notion
of equality of opportunities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
discusses the main features of human capital distribution under the two education
systems at compulsory level. Section 3 compares the two systems under e¢ ciency and




I consider an economy in which individuals live for two periods. Individuals in each
generation di⁄er in two aspects: their family background and their pre-school achieve-
ment, ￿0 where ￿0 2 [0;1]. To make the model tractable, I assume that family
background takes only two values, that is, individuals can have either poor or rich
parents with probabilities 1 ￿ ￿ and ￿, respectively.5 Population size is 1. I denote
by Gb(￿0) the C.D.F. (cumulative distribution function) of ￿0 conditional on having
family background b; where b = p;r for poor and rich parents respectively. To cap-
ture the possibility that some level of positive dependence exists between parental
background and pre-school achievement, I assume that the density functions of ￿0 for
rich and poor parents, denoted by gb(￿0) for b = r;p respectively, cross only once:
Assumption 1 (A.1): There exits a unique ￿
￿




4See Scho￿eld (1995) for a discussion of the possible determinants of the impact of tracking on
college attendance from a sociological point of view.
5Alternatively we could interpret the two parent types as black or white, natives or immigrants,
etc.
5This assumption implies that, conditional on having a pre-school achievement
higher (lower) than ￿
￿
0, the probability of having rich parents is higher (lower) than
the probability of having poor parents. This implies not only that the C.D.F. of ￿0
for rich parents dominates the one for poor ones (and thus the means are ordered
between both groups) but also that the medians are ordered.6 This is not a strong
assumption. For example, consider the case where, similar to reality, ￿0 follows a
lognormal distribution within poor and rich individuals and the variance is the same
in both distributions but the mean of ￿0 is higher for rich than for poor individuals.
Figure 1 below represents the C.D.F. of ￿0 both for rich and poor students and in the
population in black, light-grey and grey line respectively. It also depicts the value
￿
￿
0. In Section 2.3 below we will see the role of ￿
￿
0 in the de￿nition of the di⁄erent
tracking systems.
Here Figure 1 (The distribution of ￿0 and the types of tracking)
Finally I assume that the support of ￿0 for both poor and rich individuals is full.






0 if ￿0 < 0
(1 ￿ ￿)Gp(￿0) + ￿Gr(￿0) if 0 ￿ ￿0 ￿ 1
1 if ￿0 > 1
(1)
In the ￿rst period of their lives, individuals accumulate human capital. At the
beginning of this period, which takes a fraction 1 ￿ ￿, where ￿ 2 [0;1], they attend
compulsory school, which is free of charge, and they are not allowed to work. During
the rest of the ￿rst period, ￿, some individuals attend college and some others work
as unskilled workers. Those who attend college become skilled workers. Observe that
the parameter ￿ can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of investment in human
capital, that is the fraction of earnings that would have been received in the absence
of the investment.
During the second period of their lives, all individuals have one unit of time and all
of them work. Those who attended college are now skilled workers, while those who
did not remain as unskilled ones. Each worker receives a wage that is proportional
to her level of human capital.
6That is, Gr(￿0) ￿ Gp(￿0) for any ￿0 2 [0;1] and Gr(￿0) < Gp(￿0) for some ￿0 2 [0;1]. See for
example Heckman (2006) where he documents the early emergence of skills gap, mainly explained
by family environments.
62.2 Production of Human Capital
At compulsory level, students are separated into di⁄erent groups or classes in terms
of their pre-school achievement. For the sake of simplicity, I consider only two groups
here. The production of human capital is assumed to depend on two factors: pre-
school achievement (￿0) and the ￿peer group￿e⁄ect that depends on the character-
istics of each student￿ s speci￿c group.7 These characteristics are summarized by the
mean achievement or ￿peer￿e⁄ect of group j, denoted by ￿
j
0.8 An individual with pre-







0) is a twice di⁄erentiable, increasing and concave function in each ar-
gument.
During the second part of the ￿rst period, each student decides whether or not
to attend college and thereby add to the human capital acquired during compulsory
school. I denote this increase by ’, which can be interpreted as the productivity of
college education. Those who decide to attend college will end up with human capital
￿2:
￿2 = ￿1(1 + ’(￿1)): (3)
As this paper focuses on comparing college attendance outcomes for students in
mixed versus tracked compulsory educational systems, I assume that the acquisition of
human capital at college is not directly a⁄ected by students￿peers at this educational
level. Rather, I assume that ’(￿1) is an increasing function only of that human capital
acquired at compulsory school, and at a decreasing rate (’1 > 0;’11 < 0).
It is important to note that the characteristics of a student￿ s assigned peer group
at compulsory level condition her ￿nal level of human capital ￿2 in two ways. It
does so directly (one￿ s compulsory school peers a⁄ect the amount of human capital
that one acquires at that level) and also indirectly, since such human capital also
7Observe that both individuals￿characteristics, pre-school achievement and parental background,
a⁄ect her ￿nal human capital, but in a di⁄erent way. Whereas individual pre-school achievement has
a direct e⁄ect on it (since further human capital build on previous achievement) parental background
has an indirect e⁄ect through the positive dependence with individual pre-school achievement.
8There is an intense debate on the in￿ uence of peers on individual educational attainment.
However, this assumption is commonly accepted in the literature. See, among others, Bishop (2006),
Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple, Newlon and Romano (2002) who also assume that peers a⁄ect
an individual through the mean of their characteristics.
7determines the productivity of higher education and, thus, as we will see below, can
in￿ uence the student￿ s decision whether or not to attend college.9
2.3 Educational Systems at Compulsory Level
This section describes the two contrasting educational systems, mixing and tracking,
and analyzes the distribution of human capital at the end of compulsory level under
each system.
2.3.1 Mixing
Under mixing, the pre-school achievement distribution is the same in both classrooms
and the average pre-school achievement within each classroom, denoted ￿
m
0 , coincides
with the average pre-school achievement in the population.
Under mixing, ￿1 will lie in the support [m;m] where m and m denote the level
of human capital ￿1 acquired under mixing by the ￿worst￿ (the lowest pre-school
achiever) and the ￿best￿(the highest pre-school achiever) student in the population.





0 if ￿1 < m
(1 ￿ ￿)Gm
p (￿1) + ￿Gm
r (￿1) if m ￿ ￿1 ￿ m
1 if ￿1 > m;
(4)
where Gm
b (￿1) = Gb(￿￿1(￿1;￿
m
0 )) for b = p;r and ￿￿1 denotes the inverse of the
human capital production function.
2.3.2 Tracking
Tracking students implies grouping them by their pre-school achievement level. For
the sake of simplicity I permit only two tracks and denote by ￿ 2 (0;1) and (1 ￿ ￿)
the proportion of students in the low and the high track respectively. In addition
I denote by t(￿;￿) the threshold level of pre-school achievement used for grouping
students into one track or the other. Thus, a student is assigned to the high (low)
track when his/her pre-school achievement ￿0 is above (below) t(￿;￿). In order to
9Betts and Morell (1999) ￿nd a direct link between the quality of one￿ s high-school peer group
and one￿ s college grade point average. Hahn et al. (2008) also ￿nd that peers￿at high school level
a⁄ect the student￿ s decision regarding college attendance. In Section 4, I discuss the implications of
this speci￿cation on the di⁄erent results.
8simplify notation, in the sequel I will refer to t(￿;￿) as t. From (1) the threshold level
t(￿;￿) it is implicitly de￿ned by the condition :
(1 ￿ ￿)Gp(t) + ￿Gr(t) = ￿: (5)
Observe that the higher ￿ the more elitist is the tracking system. I propose two
types of tracking according to their level of elitism. These alternatives captures how
￿segregated￿are rich and poor students between the low and the high track. Given
a proportion of rich individuals in the population, ￿ we say that tracking is elitist if
G(￿
￿
0) ￿ ￿, which implies that t ￿ ￿
￿
0. In this case it is clear that conditional on being
assigned to the high track (i.e. ￿0 ￿ t) the probability of being rich is always higher
than the probability of being poor. In the opposite case, that is if G(￿
￿
0) ￿ ￿ (which
implies that t ￿ ￿
￿
0) we say that tracking is non-elitist. In this case, conditional on
being assigned to the high track (i.e. ￿0 ￿ t) the probability of being rich might be
lower than the probability of being poor. Figure 1 above illustrates these notions.
Figure 1 (a) depicts the non-elitist tracking and Figure 1 (b) the elitist tracking. Below
we will see the role of the degree of elitism of tracking on the comparison between
tracking and mixing according to equality of opportunities and in determining the





0(￿;￿) to denote average pre-school achievement levels for


















where g(￿0) denotes the p.d.f. (probability density function) of ￿0 in the population.
It is straightforward to check that the more elitist the tracking system is (i.e. the
higher is ￿), the higher the average pre-school achievement both in the low and the
high track.
In the low track, ￿1 lies within the interval [l;l]. We denote by l and l the human
capital ￿1 acquired in the low track by the ￿worst￿(lowest pre-school achiever) and
the ￿best￿(highest pre-school achiever) student respectively. Likewise, in the high
track, ￿1 lies within the interval [h;h]. We denote by h and h the human capital ￿1
acquired in the high track by the ￿worst￿(lowest pre-school achiever) and the ￿best￿
(highest pre-school achiever) student.
9The C.D.F. of ￿1 under tracking, denoted by FT(￿1), is:
FT(￿1) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0 if ￿1 ￿ l
(1 ￿ ￿)Gl
p(￿1) + ￿Gl
r(￿1) if l ￿ ￿1 ￿ l
￿ if l ￿ ￿1 ￿ h
(1 ￿ ￿)Gh
p(￿1) + ￿Gh
r(￿1) if h ￿ ￿1 ￿ h






0)) for b = p;r and j = l;h.
2.4 College Attendance
Let us now look at how students decide whether or not to attend college. An impor-
tant consideration to bear in mind here is the extent to which the choice between a
tracked or mixed compulsory school system a⁄ects the demand for higher education,
by exposing students to stronger or weaker peer e⁄ects. I assume that each individual
wants to maximize her consumption, equal to her lifetime income, and that the latter
is a linear function of her total human capital. Since those who do not attend college
work as unskilled workers during a fraction ￿ of the ￿rst period and throughout the
second period, the lifetime income of any individual in this group can be expressed
as ￿1(1 + ￿): At the same time, the lifetime income of those individuals who attend
college is the skilled wage, that is, the increased level of human capital enjoyed by
college graduates ￿2 = ￿1(1 + ’(￿1)): Therefore, for all individuals who decide to
attend college the following condition must hold:
￿1(1 + ’(￿1)) ￿ ￿1(1 + ￿);
or,
’(￿1) ￿ ￿: (9)
This condition determines the minimum level of human capital that students must
acquire by the end of their compulsory education, b ￿1; if they are to attend college.
That is, b ￿1 2 (0;h) is the value that satis￿es Equation (9) with equality.10 For any
given b ￿1, let ￿s(b ￿1) denote the proportion of individuals attending college under ed-
ucational system s, for s = M;T, that is ￿s(b ￿1) = 1 ￿ Fs(b ￿1). Finally, we can de￿ne
b ￿
M
0 as the solution to b ￿
M
0 = ￿￿1(b ￿1;￿
m
0 ). That is, b ￿
M
0 is the minimum pre-school
10To ensure that b ￿1 is interior we will assume that ’(l) < ￿ < ’(h):
10achievement level that individuals must have to go on to college in the mixing educa-
tion system. Similarly we can de￿ne b ￿
T
0 as the minimum pre-school achievement level
that individuals must have to go on to college in the tracking education system. Note
from (2) that if b ￿1 ￿ l then the minimum pre-school achievement level required to
attend college under tracking belongs to the low track, b ￿
T
0 = ￿￿1(b ￿1;￿
l
0) < t and thus
b ￿
T
0 > b ￿
M
0 . Similarly, ifb ￿1 ￿ h then the minimum pre-school achievement level required
to attend college under tracking belongs to the high track, b ￿
T
0 = ￿￿1(b ￿1;￿
h
0) > t and
thus b ￿
T
0 < b ￿
M
0 . And ￿nally, for any b ￿1 2 (l;h) then b ￿
T
0 = t. The following remark
summarizes the relationship between b ￿
M
0 and b ￿
T
0:
Remark 1 The relationship between b ￿
M
0 and b ￿
T
0 depends on the value of b ￿1 :
(i) If b ￿1 ￿ l then b ￿
M
0 < b ￿
T
0 < t.
(ii) If b ￿1 ￿ h then b ￿
M
0 > b ￿
T
0 > t:
(iii) If b ￿1 2 (l;h) then b ￿
T
0 = t and either b ￿
M
0 > t or b ￿
M
0 < t:
For a given function ’(￿1), a rise in ￿ will increase b ￿1, meaning that a lower
proportion of students will attend college. For a ￿xed ￿, an upward shift of ’(￿1)
implies that a higher proportion of students will attend college.11
Finally, it is crucial to ￿nd out the interval whereb ￿1 is placed, since it characterizes
the composition of the college student body under each of the two education systems.
I de￿ne two values for the opportunity cost of college attendance, corresponding to
two compositional distributions of the college student body under tracking. Let ￿T
denote the opportunity cost such that ’(l) = ￿T. This value ￿T implies that, when
￿ < ￿T; some low track students and all high track students attend college. Let
￿T denote the opportunity cost such ’(h) = ￿T and thus, ￿T < ￿T. This value ￿T
implies that, if ￿ > ￿T, only some of the high track students attend college.
3 E¢ ciency and Equity: Tracking vs Mixing
Having described the systems of tracking and mixing, we can now address the ques-
tion posed at the beginning of the paper: which governmental grouping policy best
supports the objectives of e¢ ciency and/or equity?
11A rise in ￿ can be interpreted as either the result of an increase in the di¢ culty of college studies
or as an increase in the length of time spent at college. An upward shift of ’(￿1) can be interpreted
as an improvement in the productivity of higher education.
113.1 An E¢ cient Educational System
For the context at hand, an e¢ cient educational system is the one that maximizes
average human capital of the entire cohort by the end of second period. The existing
literature has studied the e¢ cient education system by focusing on average human
capital at the end of the compulsory schooling phase.12 However, maximizing human
capital at compulsory level does not immediately imply that human capital is max-
imized at the end of the whole educational process. To see this let E2s(b ￿1) denote
average human capital of the entire individual cohort by the end of second period








where ￿1s denotes the human capital ￿1 acquired by the worst student (lowest pre-
school achiever) under education system s, that is, ￿1M = m and ￿1T = l, and ￿1s
denotes the human capital ￿1 acquired by the ￿best￿student (the highest pre-school
achiever) under education system s, that is, ￿1M = m and ￿1T = h. Let E1s denote
average human capital at the end of the compulsory schooling phase under education
system s. Then, by using the p.d.f. of ￿0 we can rewrite Equation (10):
E2s(b ￿
s










Observe that the second term is the increase in the human capital acquired by
those students who choose to attend college, those with ￿0 ￿ b ￿
s
0. Therefore, maxi-
mizing human capital at compulsory level does not guarantee that human capital is
maximized at the end of the whole educational process. Instead, college attendance
rates might also be considered in this analysis.
Below I explore which of the two educational system maximizes college attendance
rates. As we shall see, it crucially depends on the opportunity cost of college atten-
dance and on the wealth level in the population. To compare tracking and mixing
here we have to compare FT(￿1) and FM(￿1). Using Equation (4) for FM(￿1) and
12Hidalgo-Hidalgo (2008) ￿nds that tracking maximizes average human capital at compulsory
level. In addition, she ￿nd that the di⁄erence between average human capital under the two sys-
tems, decreases with the elasticity of substitution between peer e⁄ects and individual pre-school
achievement. Arnott and Rowse (1987) and Benabou (1996) ￿nd a similar result.
12Equation (8) for FT(￿1), and since G
j
b(￿1) is decreasing with ￿
j
0 for j = m;l;h, we
can check that for any ￿1 2 (0;l), FT(￿1) ￿ FM(￿1) > 0 for every ￿, whereas for any
￿1 2 (h;h), FT(￿1) ￿ FM(￿1) < 0 for every ￿. That is, neither system dominates the
other according to ￿rst order stochastic dominance. Thus, I can de￿ne e ￿1 2 (l;h)
as the level of human capital such that FT(e ￿1) = FM(e ￿1).13 We need this value for
Propositions 1 and Corollary 2 below. As a result it is clear that, for any ￿1 2 (0;e ￿1)
then FT(￿1) ￿ FM(￿1) > 0, whereas for any ￿1 2 (e ￿1;h) then FT(￿1) ￿ FM(￿1) < 0:
That is, the density function of ￿1 under tracking accumulates more probability in
the tails than under mixing, which shows that the distribution of ￿1 under tracking
is more dispersed than it is under mixing.
Proposition 1 below provides a ￿rst approach regarding which system maximizes
college attendance.




Proof. Recall ￿rst that t is such that (1 ￿ ￿)Gp(t) + ￿Gr(t) = ￿. Now, from the
de￿nition of e ￿1 (see footnote 13) and Gm
b (￿1) it can be checked that ￿￿1(e ￿1;￿
m
0 ) = t.
From the fact that FM always cuts FT from below, a necessary and su¢ cient condition
to ensure that ￿M(b ￿1) < (>) ￿T(b ￿1) is that e ￿1 < (>)b ￿1 or, alternatively, b ￿
M
0 > (<)t.
Observe that if b ￿
M
0 is very low, then there will be a mass university. Mixing
maximizes college attendance rates in this situation since it provides with more human
capital ￿1 than tracking to all those with low pre-school achievement levels, that is
those who might not attend college. However if b ￿
M
0 is very high, then the college
student body will be very limited. Thus, maximum college attendance is better
achieved under tracking since it provides with more human capital ￿1 than mixing
to all those with high pre-school achievement, that is those who might not attend
college in this situation.
As Corollary 2 shows, regardless of the type of tracking, there are two crucial
variables that determine whether the minimum pre-school achievement level required
to attend college under mixing is above or below the threshold level of ￿0 used to
separate students under tracking, and thus which is the system that maximizes college
13Note that e ￿1 is such that FM(e ￿1) = ￿. From Equation (4) e ￿1 is implicitly de￿ned as follows:
(1 ￿ ￿)Gm
p (e ￿1) + ￿Gm
r (e ￿1) = ￿.
13attendance. These variables are the opportunity cost of college attendance ￿, and
the wealth level in the population, captured by ￿, the proportion of rich individuals
in the population.
Corollary 2 The system that maximizes college attendance depends on the opportu-
nity cost of college attendance as follows:
(i) If ￿ ￿ ￿T, then the system that maximizes college attendance is always mixing.
(ii) If ￿T < ￿ < ￿T, then the system that maximizes college attendance is tracking
when ￿ is low and it is mixing when ￿ is high.
(iii) If ￿ ￿ ￿T, then the system that maximizes college attendance is always tracking.
Proof. Recall that since FM always cuts FT from below, a necessary and su¢ cient
condition to ensure that ￿M(b ￿1) > (<)￿T(b ￿1) is that e ￿1 > (<)b ￿1. If ￿ ￿ ￿T, then we
have e ￿1 > b ￿1 for all ￿. Now assume that ￿ 2 (￿T;￿T) and, thus, b ￿1 2 (l;h). For each
value of b ￿1, there is one value of ￿, denoted by e ￿, such that e ￿1(e ￿) = b ￿1. Thus, since
e ￿1 is increasing with ￿ we have that, if ￿ < e ￿ then e ￿1 < b ￿1 and when ￿ > e ￿ then,
e ￿1 > b ￿1. Finally, if ￿ ￿ ￿T, we have e ￿1 < b ￿1 for every ￿:
Here Figure 2 (College Attendance under both systems)
Corollary 2 shows that both the opportunity cost of college attendance and the wealth
level in the population determine whether the minimum pre-school achievement level
under mixing, b ￿
M
0 is lower or higher than the threshold level of ￿0 used to separate
students under tracking, t. With respect to the opportunity cost of college attendance
recall that a rise in ￿ will increase b ￿1 and as a result a lower proportion of individ-
uals will attend college. Regarding the wealth level observe that e ￿1 is an increasing
function of ￿. When there are few wealthy individuals (￿ is low), then FM surpasses
FT for a low value of ￿1. As societal wealth increases, average human capital also
rises, and the crossing point e ￿1 moves to the right. In other words, the C.D.F. under
mixing will fall below the C.D.F. under tracking for a larger interval of values of ￿1.
Figure 2 illustrates Corollary 2. The intuition is as follows. First, regardless of the
wealth level in the population, most high pre-school achievers will attend college when
the opportunity cost of college attendance is low (￿ ￿ ￿T). Observe from Remark 1
that in this situation the minimum pre-school achievement level required to attend
college under mixing is below the threshold used to separate students under tracking,
i.e. b ￿
M
0 < t. Therefore, intervention must be targeted toward those who performed
14poorly in pre-school. As the peer e⁄ect is stronger for these students under mixing




0), college attendance is maximized by the former.14
When the opportunity cost is high (￿ ￿ ￿T), the opposite result is obtained. In this
context, most low pre-school achievers are excluded from college under either system.
Note from Remark 1 that a high opportunity cost of college attendance induces high
minimum pre-school achievement required to attend college, i.e. b ￿
M
0 > t. Intervention
should target those who performed well during pre-school, as they are the only ones
who will potentially attend college. Choosing tracking is the best way to meet this






When the opportunity cost takes an intermediate value, it is the wealth level in the
population (as captured by ￿) that ultimately determines which educational system
maximizes college attendance. If the wealth level is very low, the case is similar to
that where ￿ is high. In this situation, pre-school achievement levels are very low
and thus most pre-school achievers will be excluded from college regardless of the
educational systems prevailing at compulsory level. Thus, the appropriate choice in
order to maximize college attendance consists of the system that enhances the peer
e⁄ect. If the wealth level is very high, the situation resembles the one where ￿ is
low. In this case, the best system is the one that maximizes college attendance rates
among low pre-school achievers, as most high pre-school achievers will attend college
irrespective of which educational system is selected.
Note that as ￿ increases, the proportion of students for whom mixing is better
than tracking, that is, students with low pre-school achievement levels and wealthy
parents, decreases. The population must therefore include a proportionally high
number of wealthy students, enough to o⁄set the lower human capital acquired by
those high pre-school achievers who were also poor (for whom tracking is better than
14A look at the case of Spain during the 1980s may help to clarify this result. Faced with low
college attendance rates, the priority of the government at that time was to increase the number of
college students. The low opportunity cost of college attendance, together with a compulsory-level
educational system based on mixing, yielded an extraordinary increase in the number of college
students from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (from 744,115 in 1983/84 to 1,508,842 in 1995/96.
See Estad￿stica Universitaria (2003)).
15This result may explain the empirical evidence found by Hahn et al. (2008), in their study based
on Korean data regarding high school graduates. They conclude that the number of high school
graduates who entered top universities (i.e., those universities for which b ￿1 is high) was higher under
a tracking system than it was under a mixing system.
15mixing).
Finally, some conclusions may be drawn as to which of two systems maximizes
average human capital by the end of the second period, E2s(b ￿1). In particular, the
following Proposition shows that if tracking maximizes both average human capital
at compulsory level and college attendance rates, then it is the e¢ cient system:
Proposition 3 Let ￿T(b ￿1) > ￿M(b ￿1). If E1T > E1M then E2T(b ￿1) > E2M(b ￿1).
Proof. Let ￿T(b ￿1) > ￿M(b ￿1) and then, from Proposition 1 we have that b ￿
M
0 > t.
From Remark 1 we know that then b ￿
M
0 > b ￿
T
0 where b ￿
T
0 > t. Thus, from Equation (11)
the average human capital under tracking is:





































0 ) > 0 then E1T > E1M is a su¢ cient condition to guarantee E2T(b ￿1) >
E2M(b ￿1).
The intuition is as follows. Assume that the opportunity cost of college at-
tendance is very high, then from Corollary 2 we know that tracking is the sys-
tem that guarantees maximum college attendance. In particular, those individuals




0 ) would attend college only under track-
ing. In addition, since the peer e⁄ect that these students enjoy under tracking is
stronger than the one they enjoy under mixing, for them the increase in human














0 )g(￿0)d￿0). As a result, if tracking maximizes av-
erage human capital at compulsory level then it also maximizes average human capital
at the end of the whole educational process.
In all other cases, the ￿nal result regarding which system maximizes average
human capital across the population depends on which of the two determining factors,
16E1s or the total increase in human capital acquired by those individuals who choose
to attend college dominates the other. For example, consider the case where average
human capital at compulsory level is higher under mixing than it is under tracking,
and mixing maximizes college attendance. However, in this case the increase in human
capital experienced by those individuals with pre-school achievement ￿0 ￿ t (and thus,
who would attend college regardless of the education system) is higher under tracking










0 )g(￿0)d￿0). Thus, if
the increase in human capital acquired by those students who would attend college
only under mixing (i.e. those with ￿0 2 (b ￿
M
0 , b ￿
T
0)) is higher than the lost in human
capital experienced by those who would attend college regardless of the education
system then mixing is the e¢ cient system.
If the government seeks to achieve e¢ ciency, its best option will depend on the
properties of the human capital production at compulsory level, the opportunity
cost of college attendance and the wealth level in the population. If we assume
that ￿0 and ￿
j
0 are close complements then E1T > E1M. In this case tracking will
also maximize average human capital across the population if the opportunity cost
of college attendance is su¢ ciently high or the wealth level in the population is
su¢ ciently low.
3.2 Equality of Opportunities
Most governments care about equity issues in a broad sense, although there seems to
be no single, widely-accepted de￿nition of equity. To circumvent this problem, and
for our purposes, I propose that an equal-opportunity policy should aim to equalize
college entrance probabilities among students of di⁄ering family backgrounds but
similar pre-school achievement.
For any given minimum level of human capital required to attend college b ￿1; let
￿b;s(b ￿1) denote the probability of college attendance among students with parental
background b, for b = p;r under education system s for s = M;T. Thus:
￿b;s(b ￿1) = 1 ￿ Fs(b ￿1 j b) = 1 ￿ G
j
b(b ￿1); (14)
where Fs(b ￿1 j b) denotes the C.D.F. of ￿1 under education system s conditional on
having parental background b; and G
j
b(b ￿1) = Gb(￿￿1(b ￿1;￿
j
0)) for j = m;l, h.
Thus, equality of opportunities implies that ￿p;s(b ￿1) should equal ￿r;s(b ￿1) and the
grouping criteria is proposed as a policy instrument for guaranteeing it. Speci￿cally,
17I suggest that governments choose the education system under which the college
attendance gap between rich and poor students is the narrowest. The college atten-
dance gap b ￿s(b ￿1) under education system s, for s = M;T, is de￿ned as the di⁄erence
between the college attendance probabilities for rich and poor students:
b ￿s(b ￿1) = ￿r;s(b ￿1) ￿ ￿p;s(b ￿1): (15)
In the sequel, and in order to consider realistic situations, attention is restricted to the
interior case where a proper subset of each type, rich and poor, attend college under
either regime, i.e. b ￿1 2 (m;m). Thus, from Equations (4) and (15), the attendance
gap under mixing is:
b ￿M(b ￿1) = G
m
p (b ￿1) ￿ G
m
r (b ￿1); (16)
and from Equations (8) and (15), the attendance gap under tracking is:
b ￿T(b ￿1) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
Gl
p(b ￿1) ￿ Gl
r(b ￿1) if m ￿ ￿1 ￿ l
Gp(t) ￿ Gr(t) if l ￿ ￿1 ￿ h
Gh
p(b ￿1) ￿ Gh
r(b ￿1) if h ￿ ￿1 ￿ m;
(17)
Therefore, the comparison between b ￿M(b ￿1) and b ￿T(b ￿1) depends on the minimum
level of human capital required to attend college, b ￿1 which determines a minimum











b(b ￿1) the college attendance gap
under education system s is:
b ￿(b ￿
s
0) = Gp(b ￿
s
0) ￿ Gr(b ￿
s
0); (18)
for any b ￿
s







0. This result on b ￿(b ￿
s
0) is useful in the analysis that follows.
Lemma 4 The college attendance gap under both systems b ￿(b ￿
s


































As follows from (A.1), conditional of having a pre-school achievement level in the
interval [0;￿
￿
0) the probability of having poor parents is higher than the probability
of having rich parents. The reverse occurs for any pre-school achievement level in
18the interval (￿
￿
0,1]. Thus, it is clear that the college attendance gap, that is, the
di⁄erence between the cumulative probabilities of pre-school achievement for poor
and rich students, must be the highest for students with ￿0 = ￿
￿
0.
In addition, from Lemma 4 it is straightforward that the college attendance gap
under tracking b ￿(b ￿
T
0) and mixing b ￿(b ￿
M
0 ) crucially depends on whether the pre-school
achievement level required to attend college under mixing b ￿
M
0 is higher or lower than
the pre-school achievement level required to attend college under tracking b ￿
T
0. Recall
from Remark 1 that this relationship depends on whether b ￿1 lies in the low or in the
high track.
Using Lemma 4 and Remark 1 we can now compare the college attendance gap
under tracking and mixing for any b ￿1. In addition Proposition 1 above shows that the
proportion of college students under mixing is higher (lower) than under tracking if
the minimum level of human capital required to attend college b ￿1 is below (above) e ￿1.
What we study here is the impact of b ￿1 being below or above e ￿1 on the mass of rich
and poor students attending college, which in turn determines the attendance gap
under either system. Observe from (16) and (17) above that if the minimum level
of human capital required to attend college is such that the proportion of college
students under both systems coincides, that is, if b ￿1 = e ￿1, then the attendance gap
under both systems coincides too:16
b ￿M(e ￿1) ￿ b ￿T(e ￿1) = 0 (19)
In addition to e ￿1 there might be some other level of human capital required to
attend college, denoted by ￿
0
1 such that the college attendance gap under both edu-
cation systems coincides. Proposition 5 below shows that whether or not ￿
0
1 di⁄ers
from e ￿1 and the precise interval where it belongs to depends on the type of tracking.
Therefore this aspect determines for which precise set of values of b ￿1 tracking is the
most equitable system. For expositional purposes I de￿ne two values for the oppor-
tunity cost of college attendance, corresponding to two compositional distributions
of the college student body. Let ￿ = minf’(e ￿1);’(￿
0
1)g and ￿ = maxf’(e ￿1);’(￿
0
1)g.
Notice that if the opportunity cost is equal to ￿ or ￿, then the attendance gap under
both educational systems coincides. However, the underlying student composition
body under tracking di⁄ers between them. If ￿ = ￿, then some low track students
and all high track students attend college under tracking (since ￿ < ￿T), whereas if
16Recall that e ￿1 2 (l;h) and thus from Equation (17) b ￿T(e ￿1) = Gp(t) ￿ Gr(t). In addition,
e ￿1 = ￿(t;￿
m
0 ) and thus from Equation (16) b ￿M(e ￿1) = Gp(t) ￿ Gr(t).
19￿ = ￿, then all of the high track students and none of the low track ones attend col-
lege (since ￿ > ￿T). Proposition 5 below shows that the opportunity cost of college
attendance is a crucial variable in determining the most equitable system.
Proposition 5 The most equitable system depends on the opportunity cost of college
attendance:
(i) If ￿ 2 [￿;￿] then tracking is the most equitable system.
(ii) If ￿ < ￿ or ￿ > ￿ then mixing is the most equitable system.
Proof. (1) Let tracking be elitist and then t ￿ ￿
￿
0. First it can be checked that for
any b ￿1 ￿ h then b ￿T(b ￿1) > b ￿M(b ￿1). Observe that it implies that b ￿
T
0 > t which, from
Remark 1, implies that b ￿
M
0 > b ￿
T
0. Since t ￿ ￿
￿




0 which, from Lemma
4 implies that b ￿(b ￿
T
0) > b ￿(b ￿
M




0) then b ￿T(b ￿1) > b ￿M(b ￿1).




0. Since t ￿ ￿
￿
0 this implies that b ￿
T
0 < t. From
Remark 1 we have that in this case b ￿
M
0 < b ￿
T
0 which from Lemma 4 implies that
b ￿(b ￿
T
0) > b ￿(b ￿
M









is clear from Remark 1 that ￿
￿
0 < b ￿
M
0 < b ￿
T
0 < t which, from Lemma 4 implies that





















0 )) it is




0 < t = b ￿
T
0 and thus from Lemma 4 we might




0 )) or only for some b ￿1 in this













1 < e ￿1. Therefore in the elitist tracking ￿ = ’(￿
0
1) and ￿ = ’(e ￿1). (2) Let
tracking be non-elitist and then t < ￿
￿
0. First it can be checked that for any b ￿1 ￿ l
then b ￿T(b ￿1) > b ￿M(b ￿1). Observe that it implies that b ￿
T
0 < t which, from Remark 1,
implies that b ￿
M
0 < b ￿
T
0. Since t < ￿
￿




0 which, from Lemma 4 implies that
b ￿(b ￿
T
0) > b ￿(b ￿
M




0) then b ￿T(b ￿1) > b ￿M(b ￿1). Observe that it




0. Since t < ￿
￿
0 this implies that b ￿
T
0 > t. From Remark 1 we have
that in this case b ￿
M
0 > b ￿
T
0 which from Lemma 4 implies that b ￿(b ￿
T
0) > b ￿(b ￿
M
0 ). Now








0 )) it is clear from Remark 1
that t < b ￿
T




0 which, from Lemma 4 implies that b ￿T(b ￿1) < b ￿M(b ￿1). Then










0)) and thus ￿
0
1 > e ￿1. Suppose








0 );h) it is clear from Remark 1 that
b ￿
T
0 = t < ￿
￿
0 < b ￿
M
0 and thus from Lemma 4 we might have that b ￿T(b ￿1) < b ￿M(b ￿1)




0 );h) or only for some b ￿1 in this interval. In both cases it can










0)) and thus ￿
0
1 > e ￿1. Therefore in the
non-elitist tracking ￿ = ’(e ￿1) and ￿ = ’(￿
0
1).
Several comments can be made. The ￿rst one is that there is no system for which
the college attendance gap is always the narrowest, for any minimum level of human
capital required to attend college b ￿1. Instead the comparison between b ￿M(b ￿1) and
b ￿T(b ￿1) depends on the particular value of b ￿1 or on the opportunity cost of college
attendance, ￿. Second, regardless of the type of tracking, if the opportunity cost of
college attendance is either too low or too high mixing is the most equitable system.
The intuition could be as follows. For each b ￿1, we must focus on the individuals at
the margin, that is on those whose decision whether or not to attend college depends
critically on their family background and may be shaped by the educational system
prevailing. If the opportunity cost of college attendance is low, in particular ￿ < ￿
(which implies that the minimum level of human capital required to attend college b ￿1
is very low) then the group of individuals at the margin are those students with low
levels of ￿0 who under tracking are placed in the low track. Since the peer e⁄ect is
stronger under mixing than it is in the low track, then the family background plays
also a less important role there. Thus, the attendance gap will be narrower under
mixing than it is under tracking. Similarly, if ￿ takes very high values, particularly
￿ > ￿, then the set of individuals at the margin is comprised of those with very
high levels of ￿0. Therefore the set of individuals at the margin is comprised of those
with very high levels of ￿0. Recall that advanced students experience a higher peer
e⁄ect under tracking than they do under mixing and that the mean of ￿0 conditional
on having poor parents is lower than the mean of ￿0 conditional on having rich
parents. The di⁄erence in ￿1 for rich versus poor students will be higher under
tracking than under mixing, therefore, due to the complementarity between peer
e⁄ects and individual achievement.
The third lesson we extract is that if ￿ takes intermediate values, then the type
of tracking (elitist or non-elitist) is the only aspect that determines whether there
is room for tracking to be the most equitable system and for which precise set of
values of b ￿1 it is so. Suppose ￿rst that tracking is non-elitist. Then the group of
individuals at the margin would be placed into the high track where the peer e⁄ect
is the strongest, and family background will not critically condition the total human
capital that each student may acquire in compulsory school. By contrast, under
mixing since the peer e⁄ect is lower than it is in the high track, family background
21has a higher relative weight. Thus, the attendance gap will be higher under mixing
than it is under tracking. Finally, assume that tracking is elitist. Then, the group
of individuals at the margin would be placed in the low track. Recall from the
de￿nition of elitist tracking that, in this case conditional on being assigned to the low
track (i.e. ￿0 ￿ t) the probability of being rich might be higher than the probability
of being poor. In addition consider that these students experience a higher peer e⁄ect
under mixing than they do under tracking and that the mean of ￿0 conditional on
having poor parents is lower than the mean of ￿0 conditional on having rich parents.
The di⁄erence in ￿1 for rich versus poor students will be higher under mixing than
under tracking, therefore, again due to the complementarity between peer e⁄ects
and individual achievement. In the numerical example below we perform a detailed
analysis of both types of tracking: elitist versus non-elitist.
3.2.1 A numerical example: elitist vs non-elitist tracking
In order to illustrate the results on the comparison between b ￿M(b ￿1) and b ￿T(b ￿1) I
present and discuss numerical simulations so that the results will provide suggestive
evidence about the education system that better achieves equality of opportunities.
To get closed-form solutions, the model in Hidalgo-Hidalgo (2008) is adopted and
extended to consider college attendance. Thus, regarding the distribution of pre-
school achievement, I assume that Gr (￿0) = ￿0 and Gp (￿0) = ￿
￿
0 where ￿ 2 (0;1].
That is, the lower is ￿, the higher the gap in pre-school achievement between poor
and rich students.17
With respect to the production of human capital at compulsory level ￿(￿0;￿
j
0), I











where A > 1, ￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿ 2 (￿1;1]. The parameter ￿ captures the weight of
pre-school achievement on ￿1. Observe that, for ￿ su¢ ciently low, both ￿0 and ￿
j
0
have a high level of complementarity and as ￿ tends to 1, the two factors become
perfect substitutes.
17Observe from (15) and the de￿nition of Gr (￿0) and Gp (￿0) above that @b ￿s(b ￿1)=@￿ < 0 for s =
M;T. That is, for both educational systems and as expected, the lower the pre-school achievement
gap, the lower the attendance gap between the rich and the poor.
18See Hidalgo-Hidalgo (2008) for a detailed discussion of the properties of this education produc-
tion function and how it captures the main empirical evidence.
22The college attendance gap under both educational system are now compared for
two societies that di⁄er in the level of elitism of their tracking systems, captured by
parameter ￿.
To perform this numerical exercise, I need to look for reasonable values of the
parameters. However, scant empirical evidence exists on some crucial parameters,
which must be kept in mind when interpreting the results. This exercise should not
be taken as a full-￿ edged calibration exercise, since the model is too abstract to be
calibrated properly. We need common values for ￿; ￿, ￿ and ￿ for both and two levels
of ￿ for each society. Table 1 shows the selected parameter values. This selection is
brie￿ y explained below.








As families, rather than schools, are mainly responsible for the inequalities in
school performance (see the Coleman Report and more recent works such as those by
Heckman (2006) and references therein), it seems appropriate to assign a high value
to ￿. In particular, I ￿x ￿ = 3=4. The value for ￿ is drawn from OECD data. Recall
that ￿ captures the proportion of rich individuals in the population. According to the
OECD questionnaire on household income distribution (2002), the proportion of in-
dividuals considered as poor averaged 10%, with an increasing tendency (see OECD
(2002)).19 Hence I set ￿ = 5=6, which also seems appropriate if we, alternatively,
interpret ￿ as the proportion of natives in the population.20 There is no empirical
evidence on the degree of complementarity/substitutability between peer e⁄ects and
19In most studies on poverty, the poor are all individuals living in households with income below
the poverty line, which is ￿xed at 50% of national median adjusted income. See Collado and Iturbe-
Ormaetxe (2008) for an in-depth analysis of this topic.
20Immigrants accounted for just under 12% of the total population in OECD countries in 2006
(see OECD (2008)).
23individual pre-school achievement. However, recent empirical evidence (see Ding and
Lehrer (2007) and Kim et al. (2006)) suggests that both factors are close comple-
ments. Thus, I set ￿ = 3=4 which corresponds to an elasticity of substitution between
￿0 and ￿
j
0 equal to 4. The value of ￿ is also drawn from OECD data. Speci￿cally, I
assume ￿ = 0:8, which means that the mean pre-school achievement level for poor
students represents 89% of the achievement level for rich students (see PISA 2003
Report).21
The elitism parameter ￿ for the non-elitist society is chosen so that the proportion
of students in the low track matches the average proportion of 15-year-olds enrolled
in programmes that give access to either vocational studies or to the labour market
in OECD countries in 2006 (11.3%). However, the parameter ￿ for the elitist society
is simply chosen high enough to contrast the non-elitist case. 22
Figure 3 depicts b ￿M(b ￿1) and b ￿T(b ￿1) for both societies. Here b ￿M(b ￿1) is shown as a
solid line and b ￿T(b ￿1) as a dashed line.
Here Figure 3 (The college attendance gap)
Figure 3 con￿rms the results in Proposition 5 regarding which system minimizes
the attendance gap. In particular, in both societies b ￿T(b ￿1) > b ￿M(b ￿1) if b ￿1 is suf-
￿ciently low or high whereas b ￿T(b ￿1) < b ￿M(b ￿1) if b ￿1 takes intermediate values. In
addition, in the non-elitist tracking the set of students for which tracking is more
equitable than mixing are in the high track whereas in the elitist tracking the set of
students for which tracking is more equitable than mixing are in the low track. It
is immediate to check that the di⁄erence between the college attendance gap under
tracking and mixing for students with intermediate levels of b ￿1 can be signi￿cant (up
to 3.4% in the non-elitist case and to 13.6% in the elitist case).
To conclude, contrary to the general belief that equality of opportunities is best
achieved under mixing, I ￿nd that tracking may be a more e⁄ective means of achieving
that goal in some cases. In e⁄ect, my study suggests that switching from tracking
to mixing will not automatically further each student￿ s access to equal opportunities.
Indeed, it will actively work against that goal for students with intermediate levels of
21According to the PISA 2003 results for OECD countries, the mean in math performance among
immigrants represents about 90%, on average, of the mean in math performance for native students.
22In addition it also matches the corresponding proportion of 15-year-olds enrolled in programmes
that give access to either vocational studies or to the labour market for countries like some Serbia
(75.7%) and is close to some EU contries like The Netherlands (55%).
24￿0. This result is quite surprising and contrasts with the main conclusions heretofore
reported in the empirical literature on the subject, including studies by Hanushek
and Woessmann (2006) and Brunello and Checchi (2007) (see my comments above).
Finally, this result is consistent with observed stylized facts. Some European
countries are experiencing a decline in college attendance and an increase in college
drop-out rates. The most notable example is Spain where, even without explicitly
mentioning it, the most recent education reform during the 1990s (known as LOGSE),
entailed a mixing grouping system. There, both of the e⁄ects commented above are
particularly strong among those students with intermediate levels of achievement,
who might have graduated from college under a di⁄erent grouping policy.23
3.3 On the trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and equity
Finally I would like to comment on the possibility of a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency
and equity. If we assume complementarity between peer e⁄ects and individual pre-
school achievement, then E1T > E1M and from Propositions 3 and 5 the presence of
trade-o⁄s between e¢ ciency and equity will depend solely on the opportunity cost of
college attendance and the societal wealth.
First, if the opportunity cost of college attendance is low (which implies that b ￿1 is
low), then mixing might achieve both e¢ ciency and equity. In this case, Corollary 2
implies that the probability that students, of any parental background, attend college
is always higher under mixing than under tracking. Proposition 5 also shows mixing
to be the most equitable system. Yet mixing does not maximize the average human
capital obtained at the compulsory level (under the assumption of complementarity
between peer e⁄ects and individual achievement). However, if the increase in the level
of human capital brought about by college attendance is high enough to compensate
for the lower average human capital achieved at the compulsory level, then mixing will
maximize average human capital across the population and will be both the e¢ cient
system and the one that better guarantees equality of opportunities among students.
23LOGSE is the Spanish abbreviation for Ley de Ordenaci￿n General del Sistema Educativo.
Among other things, this reform raised the compulsory schooling age to 16 and softened the require-
ments for grade advancement. Today we observe a decrease in the entry rates into tertiary-type A
programmes from 47% in 2000 to 43% in 2006 (see Education at a Glance 2008). In addition, the
proportion of college students among those in the corresponding age group whose parents hold a
secondary education degree dropped from 55% in 1998 to 45% in 2007 (see EPA 2008 and Albert
(2008)).
25Figure 4 displays these results. It represents the values ￿r;s(b ￿1) and ￿p;s(b ￿1) for the
non- elitist and elitist societies. Here, ￿b;M(b ￿1) is shown as a solid line and ￿b;T(b ￿1)
as a dashed line for both poor (in black) and rich (in grey).
Here Figure 4 (College attendance rates for poor and rich students)
Second, observe that tracking can be both e¢ cient and equitable in some situa-
tions. For example, if the opportunity cost of college attendance takes intermediate
values and wealth level in the population is low, then whether tracking is also e¢ cient
in this interval depends on the type of tracking. If it is non-elitist, then tracking guar-
antees higher college attendance rates (for both rich and poor students) than mixing.
However, if tracking is elitist, then college attendance rates (for both rich and poor
students) are lower under tracking than under mixing. Figure 4 illustrates this result.
Note that, in the non-elitist case the interval where b ￿1 might lie partially corresponds
to students in the high track. Observe that the probability of college attendance,
for students of any parental background is always higher under tracking than un-
der mixing. However, in the elitist case this interval of b ￿1 partially corresponds to
students in the low track. Thus, the probability of college attendance, for students
of any parental background is always higher under mixing than under tracking. To
conclude, provided that tracking is non-elitist it will not only be the e¢ cient system
but also the most equitable one according to Propositions 3 and 5.
Finally, a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and equity will clearly take place when the
opportunity cost of college attendance is high. According to Proposition 3, tracking
is the e¢ cient system in this case, since it maximizes both the average human capital
at compulsory level and college attendance. Yet we from Proposition 5 above we
know that, for this case, mixing does better than tracking at guaranteeing equality
of opportunities among students. In all other cases we can not conclude that there is
not a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and equity.
4 Discussion and ￿nal Comments
This paper analyzes public intervention in education when the government, taking
into account the existence of peer e⁄ects at compulsory education level and its impact
at college level, has to decide how to group compulsory school students. Two di⁄erent
education systems (tracking and mixing) are examined. E¢ ciency and equity are
assumed to be two central governmental concerns.
26Conventional wisdom suggests that equality of opportunities is best guaranteed
under mixing. My study shows that this is not necessarily the case, and that the
impact on educational results at later stages (i.e. college attendance rates) must be
taken into account when weighing the pros and cons of either educational system.
In this context, I ￿nd tracking to be the most equitable system for students with
intermediate levels of human capital required to attend college. The degree of elitism
of tracking is found to be a central aspect in determining the existence of trade-o⁄
between e¢ ciency and equity. In particular, if tracking is non-elitist then it is not
only the most equitable system and also the most e¢ cient one if the opportunity cost
of college attendance takes intermediate values.
The paper abstracts from variation in schooling public expenditure in compul-
sory and college levels, previously considered by Arnott and Rowse (1987), Benabou
(1996) and Epple and Romano (1998) among others. Observe that the analysis of
e¢ ciency might not be reversed by considering for example the direct cost of pro-
viding college education. Higher college attendance rates imply higher total cost of
college education, however this cost will always be lower than its associated bene￿ts
(otherwise it makes no sense to promote college attendance). In addition, abstracting
from this concern enables me to isolate the role of compulsory school peer e⁄ects on
college attendance, which has not been considered in the prior literature.
The paper allows for some extensions. An important one is the introduction
of prices which are omitted in this paper under the assumption of free education
in both levels. This would imply modelling parental income explicitly and could
enable second-best analysis to be introduced in the comparison between tracking
and mixing. The crucial assumption in this analysis would be on the degree of
complementarity/substitutability between parental income and peer group e⁄ects. In
addition, we might consider the e⁄ect on wages of the number of college graduates.
I think that introducing this assumption would not change qualitatively the main
results of the paper. Note that, this would make the opportunity cost of college
attendance an endogenous variable, ￿(￿s). Thus, the equilibrium proportion of college
students under education system s, ￿s, would be given by ￿s = 1￿Fs(’￿1(￿(￿s))). If
we just consider the conventional supply e⁄ect on the skilled wage, it can be checked
that ￿s exists and it is unique. Finally, it might also be interesting to compare the
two education systems in a dynamic setup, or to consider alternative governmental
criteria with respect to equity. In this regard, we might assume that the government
wishes to maximize the probability of college attendance among only the worst-o⁄
27individuals in the population, assuming that by ￿worst-o⁄￿we mean children of poor
parents. The results in this case would be quite similar to the ones found above
(see also Hidalgo-Hidalgo (2005)): when the opportunity cost of college attendance
is low, college attendance is maximized under mixing, and the reverse is true when
the opportunity cost of college attendance is high.
Finally, I believe my results on compulsory school peers￿impact on college out-
comes are of value and seem relevant to several key issues currently under debate
among economists of education. In addition these theoretical results yield two hy-
pothesis to be tested empirically: the impact of grouping policies on the deceleration
in college entry rates recently observed in some European countries (see Education
at a Glance (2008) and Hahn et al. (2008)) and the distributional impact of these
grouping policies on students with di⁄erent background.
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Figure 1:  Distribution of  0   and types of tracking
0      
*
0 







0 ( ) G 
*
0 ( ) G 

Figure 2: College attendance under both systems
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Figure 4: College attendance for poor and rich students